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Who Watches the Watchmen?
"Vigilant Doorkeeping," the Alien Tort
Statute, and Possible Reform
KEITH A. PETTY*
I. INTRODUCTION
The Alien Tort Statute allows alien plaintiffs to file civil
actions in U.S. district courts for torts violating the law of nations
or U.S. treaties. The scope of the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) is
potentially limitless. Under the statute, litigants may include aliens
located within the United States, foreign officials, multi-national
corporations, and even U.S. government officials. The potential
scope of actionable claims is no less broad, depending on federal
court interpretation of customary international law (CIL).
Underlying these cases is a debate in the academy as to whether
the ATS is a valuable tool to combat human rights violations, or an
impediment to the role of the political branches in foreign
relations.'
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1. For exemplary articles underlying this debate and the role of CIL in U.S.
jurisprudence, see, e.g.,.Ralph G. Steinhardt, Laying One Bankrupt Critique to Rest: Sosa
v. Alvarez-Machain and the Future of International Human Rights Litigation in U.S.
Courts, 57 VAND. L. REv. 2241 (2004); Beth Stephens, Upsetting Checks and Balances:
The Bush Administration's Efforts to Limit Human Rights Litigation, 17 HARV. HUM.
RTS. J. 169 (2004) (arguing that the executive's opposition to ATS claims is not entitled to
judicial deference); Lea Brilmayer, Federalism, State Authority, and the Preemptive Power
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The U.S. Supreme Court in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain warned
that claims filed under the ATS continue to be subject to "vigilant
doorkeeping. ' ' 2 In spite of this warning, the courts do not seem
interested in playing the role of watchmen, nor well-equipped to
juggle the competing interests at stake in ATS litigation. The
struggle between plaintiffs seeking to broaden the scope of the
ATS, and defendants' attempts-often supported by the executive
branch-to limit actionable claims, is unlikely to be resolved by
the judiciary. ATS cases have yet to establish a coherent.
jurisprudence.'
Who, then, watches the watchmen? Or, in other words, who
will give the courts guidance? In several cases, the judicial branch
has called out for assistance from the political branches.' When
ATS litigation touches on foreign policy concerns, e.g., suits
against foreign heads of state, input from the executive branch
may be solicited.' In other cases, less connected to foreign affairs,
however, the executive may offer guidance that is not followed.6 A
of International Law, 1994 SuP. Cr. REV. 295, 295, 303-04, 332 n.109 (1995) (arguing the
preemptive power of international law); Harold Hongju Koh, Commentary, Is
International Law Really State Law?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1824, 1841-1860 (1998); Anne-
Marie Burley, The Alien Tort Statute and the Judiciary Act of 1789: A Badge of Honor, 83
AM. J. INT'L L. 461 (1989); Louis Henkin, International Law as Law in the United States, 82
MICH. L. REV. 1555 (1984). See also Curtis A. Bradley et al., Customary International
Law, and the Continuing Relevance of Erie, 120 HARV. L. REV. 869, 870-71 (2007)
[hereinafter Bradley et al., Customary International Law]; David H. Moore, An Emerging
Uniformity for International Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 44-45 (2006); Curtis A.
Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal Common Law: A
Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815 (1997); Phillip R. Trimble, A
Revisionist View of Customary International Law, 33 UCLA L. REV. 665 (1986); A.M.
Weisburd, State Courts, Federal Courts, and International Cases, 20 YALE J. INT'L L. 1
(1995); Julian Ku & John Yoo, Beyond Formalism in Foreign Affairs: A Functional
Approach to the Alien Tort Statute, 2004 SuP. Cr. REV. 153 (2004) (arguing that the courts
are not as well equipped as the executive to achieve the purpose of the ATS).
2. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 729 (2004).
3. John B. Bellinger, III, U.S. State Dept. Legal Advisor, The 2008 Jonathan I.
Charney Lecture in International Law at Vanderbilt Law School: Enforcing Human
Rights in U.S. Courts and Abroad: The Alien Tort Statute and Other Approaches (Apr.
11, 2008), available at http://law.vanderbilt.edu/article-search/article-detail/download.aspx?
id=2587.
4. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 731 ("welcom[ing] any congressional guidance in exercising
jurisdiction with such obvious potential to affect foreign relations"). See, e.g., Alexander v.
Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286 (2001) ("Like substantive federal law itself, private rights of
action to enforce federal law must be created in Congress."). See also Bellinger, supra
note 3.
5. See Bellinger, supra note 3.
6. For a discussion of deference to the executive in ATS cases based on specific and
foreseeable harm to U.S. foreign policy interests, see Margarita S. Clarens, Deference,
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coherent framework for ATS claims is needed, and it must come
from the legislature.
Congress is best suited to clarify the scope of actionable
claims under the ATS through its constitutional authority to
"define and punish ... Offences against the Law of Nations."7 This
article outlines the legal underpinnings of ATS actions and the
need for reform. Part II discusses the history of ATS litigation and
the difficulties inherent in limiting causes of action rooted in CIL.
The four primary subjects of ATS litigation, from Filartiga to the
present, are discussed in detail in Part III. Whether reform to the
ATS is necessary is discussed in Part IV, which outlines several
mechanisms of judicial deference and recognizes that, in spite of
these safeguards, reform is in fact necessary. This article concludes
by recommending that the Alien Tort Statute be amended to
mirror the CIL violations specified in the Third Restatement of
Foreign Relations Law, and to permit input from the executive in
cases that are likely to impact American foreign relations.
II. HISTORY OF THE ATS AND THE APPLICATION OF CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL LAW
A. Alien Tort Statute Litigation from 1789-2004
The Alien Tort Statute first appeared as a clause in the
Judiciary Act of 1789.8 In its most current form, the ATS provides:
"The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil
action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law
of nations or a treaty of the United States." 9 While the origins of
the ATS remain unclear, the historical context implies that the
Statute's "principal motivation was to provide redress for offenses
committed by U.S. persons against foreign officials in the United
States."
Human Rights and The Federal Courts: The Role of the Executive in Alien Tort Statute
Litigation, 17 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 415 (2007).
7. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
8. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73 (codified at 28 U.S.C. 1332) (2000)
(providing "the district courts shall have ... cognizance, concurrent with the courts of the
several States, or the circuit courts, as the case may be, of all causes where an alien sues
for tort only in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.").
9. Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000).
10. Bellinger, supra note 3. This view is consistent with concerns of the founders prior
to drafting the Constitution. At that time, redress for foreigners in state courts for
violations against the law of nations was both inconsistent and uncertain. Such
2009]
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The ATS remained largely dormant for almost two
centuries, " until the case of Filartiga v. Pena-Irala in 1980. 2 The
plaintiffs in that case were relatives of a Paraguayan national who
successfully sued a Paraguayan police official responsible for the
kidnapping, torture, and death of their son. 3 While human rights
advocates rightfully celebrated this decision as a clear victory, 1
questions remained as to whether the ATS was merely
jurisdictional, or whether it provided an independent cause of
action for human rights violations.
The jurisdictional issue for the Second Circuit was clear. The
ATS did not create new rights for aliens, but opened up "the
federal courts [to] adjudication of the rights already recognized by
international law."'" According to one commentator, "[t]he court
in Filartiga did not hold.., that either CIL itself or the ATS
created the plaintiffs' cause of action." 6 The strictly jurisdictional
nature of the ATS is further supported by its placement in the
Judiciary Act, which established the jurisdiction and structure of
federal courts." Nevertheless, during the twenty-four years
inconsistencies would clearly have significant foreign policy implications for the fledgling
union. Id. See also Sosa, 542 U.S. at 714-16 (citing Respublica v. De Longchamps, 1 U.S.
111 (0. T. Phila. 1784)). In addition, the Sosa court quotes the writings of James Madison:
"[t]he Continental Congress was hamstrung by its inability to 'cause infractions of treaties,
or of the law of nations to be punished."' JAMES MADISON, JOURNAL OF THE
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 60 (E. Scott ed', 1893). Sosa, 542 U.S. at 716.
11. Very few cases pre-Fildrtiga utilized the ATS. The ATS was invoked only twenty-
one times from 1789 and 1980. See Kenneth C. Randall, Further Inquiries into The Alien
Tort Statute and a Recommendation, 18 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 473, 474-751, n.8 (1986).
Fewer still allowed the case to go forward on ATS claims. See Adra v. Clift, 195 F. Supp.
857 (D. Md. 1961); Bolchos v. Darrell, 3 F. Cas. 810 (D.S.C. 1795) (No. 1,607). See also
O'Reilly De Camara v. Brooke, 209 U.S. 45, 52 (1908) (denying ATS claim against the
State for expropriation of a personal monopoly right but indicating defendant may be
personally liable); Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130, 134 (1876) (finding ATS jurisdiction
concurrent with state jurisdiction in dicta); Atkins v. The Fibre Disintegrating Co., 85 U.S.
272, 299-300 (1874) (concerning federal jurisdiction for an attachment in an admiralty
case, but only addressing the issue in dicta). See generally Eric Engle, The Alien Tort
Statute and the Torture Victims' Protection Act: Jurisdictional Foundations and Piocedural
Obstacles, 14 WILLAMETTE J. INT'L L. & DISPUTE RES. 1, 6 n.29 (2006).
12. Filirtiga v. Pefia-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
13. Id. at 878-79.
14. See, e.g., Center for Constitutional Rights, http:l/ccrjustice.org/ourcases/past-
cases/filartiga-v:-pen-irala (description of Fi.i6rtiga).
15. Fildrtiga, 630 F.2d at 887.
16. Bradley et al., Customary International Law, supra note 1, at 888.
17. Id. at 887. There is little legislative history to explain the origins of the ATS and
how it fits into the Judiciary Act. For a detailed analysis of the history of the ATS, see
Thomas H. Lee, The Safe Conduct Theory of the Alien Tort Statute, 106 COLUM. L. REV.
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following Filartiga, the debate over whether the ATS merely
provided federal courts with jurisdiction or created independent
causes of action would remain.
In the 1980s, most of the ATS suits resembled those in
Filartiga: foreign nationals suing their own government. 18 The
litigation expanded, however, in the 1990s to include suits by
private actors against multi-national corporations. 19 Specifically,
those corporations accused of aiding and abetting foreign States in
committing alleged human rights abuses.2' During the post-
Filartiga era, many courts held that the ATS was both
jurisdictional and substantive in nature.21 In fact, the lower courts
uniformly held that no additional statutory cause of action was
required to bring a claim under the ATS. 
2
The dilemma between jurisdiction and substance was due in
part to the Filartiga Court, which left the door open for ATS
claims based on violations of the "law of nations."' The scope of
the law of nations can be interpreted .rather broadly, as discussed
in greater detail below. In fact, Filartiga refuted the argument"
830 (2006) (arguing that only "safe conducts" violations were actionable under the ATS in
1789).
18. Bellinger, supra note 3, at 5-6.
19. See, e.g., Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 197 F.3d 161, 163 (5th Cir. 1999).
20. Bellinger, supra note 3, at 6.
21. Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995); In re Estate of Marcos (In re Marcos
1), Human Rights Litig., 25 F.3d 1467,1475 (9th Cir. 1994).
22. See, e.g., Papa v. United States, 281 F.3d 1004, 1012-13 (9th Cir. 2002); Wiwa v.
Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 103-06 (2d Cir. 2000); Beanal, 197 F.3d at 165;
Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844, 848 (11th Cir. 1996); Kadic, 70 F.3d at 241; Hilao v.
Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767 (9th Cir. 1996); In re Estate of Marcos (In re Marcos I),
Human Rights Litig., 978 F.2d 493, 503 (9th Cir. 1992); In re Marcos 1, 25 F.3d at 1475-76;
Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 2d 289, 320
(S.D.N.Y. 2003); Estate of Rodriguez v. Drummond Co., 256 F. Supp. 2d 1250, 1258 (N.D.
Ala, 2003); Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d 424, 441-43 (D.N.J. 1999); Jama v.
INS, 22 F. Supp. 2d 353, 362-63 (D.N.f. 1998); Doe v. Islamic Salvation Front, 993 F. Supp.
3, 7 (D.D.C. 1998); Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 179 (D. Mass. 1995); Paul v.
Avril, 812 F. Supp. 207, 212 (S.D. Fla. 1993); Forti v. Suarez-Manson, 694 F. Supp. 707, 709
(N.D. Cal. 1988). See also Mehinovic v. Vuckovic, 198 F. Supp. 2d 1322 (S.D. Ga. 2002)
(another case that completed trial). See generally Steinhardt, supra note 1, at 2244-45.
23. In this article, the phrase "law of nations" is used interchangeably with
"Customary International Law," that is, international norms that develop from sufficient
State practice, when States act out of a sense of legal obligation to do so. The "law of
nations," however, is a term of art unique to the U.S. constitutional legal system. See U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10 ("The Congress shall have Power... To define and punish
Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offences against the Law of
Nations").
24. Fildrtiga, 630 F.2d at 886.
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that the law of nations may only be designated by Congress under
the "Define and Punish" clause.2 Courts in subsequent cases were.
left with the daunting task of identifying which law of nations
norms were embodied in the federal common law, and, therefore,
actionable under the ATS.26 It was not until 2004, twenty-four
years after the Filartiga decision, that the Supreme Court set limits
to ATS claims in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain.27
B. The Alien Tort Statute after Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain: The Era
of Uncertainty
In the seminal decision of Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, the
Supreme Court affirmed the jurisdictional nature of the ATS, but
left several key issues unresolved.28 On jurisdiction, the Court
provided, "In sum, we think the statute was intended as
jurisdictional in the sense of addressing the power of the courts to
entertain cases concerned with a certain subject."29 The Court
added, however, that historically "federal courts could entertain
claims once the jurisdictional grant was on the books, because torts
in violation of the law of nations would have been recognized
within the common law of the time."30 Therefore, according to the
Court, the ATS was purely jurisdictional, but allowed the courts to
entertain causes of action under federal common law.
The next challenge, as highlighted by the Court, is defining
actionable claims under the ATS-the "scope" of ATS causes of
action. The Sosa Court provided some guidance by stating, "[W]e
think courts should require any claim based on the present-day law
of nations to rest on a norm of international character accepted by
the civilized world and defined with a specificity comparable to the
25. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
26. Historically, applying international law to federal causes of action has not been
problematic. Numerous cases apply rules of international law that are not law codified by
Congress. See, e.g., Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 281 (1796) ("When the United
States declared their independence, they were bound to receive the law of nations, in its
modern state of purity and refinement."); The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900);
Banco Nacional De Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964); The Nereide, 9 Cranch 388, 13
U.S. 388, 423 (U.S.N.Y.) (1815) (stating U.S. courts are "bound by the law of nations,
which is a part of the law of the land"); United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. 153, 158-60 (1820);
THE FEDERALIST No. 3, at 22 (John Jay) (Bourne ed., 1901).
27. See generally Sosa, 542 U.S. 692.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 714.
30. Id.
[Vol. 31:183
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features of the 18th-century paradigms we have recognized."31 The
eighteenth century paradigms recognized by the Court include
norms against the "violation of safe conducts, infringement of the
rights of ambassadors, and piracy."32 The Court recognized, in
addition to the three norms governing State conduct, the
overlapping protective norms which are "rules binding individuals
for the benefit of other individuals."33 This reading of applicable.
international law is embraced by a human rights approach to ATS
litigation, which will be discussed in greater detail below. Even
based on Sosa's guidance, however, the scope of ATS claims
remains an ill-defined battleground for litigants.
The sources of law used to define actionable violations of the.
law of nations are similarly problematic. The drafters of the ATS
did not help matters by leaving few signs of legislative intent. ", The
Constitution puts the historical law of nations in context in the
"Define and Punish" clause, which provides: "The Congress shall
have Power... To define and punish Piracies and Felonies
committed on the high Seas, and Offences against the Law of
Nations."3" In light of this provision, Congress in 1789 may have
been targeting piracy, as well as other norms of the law merchant
through the ATS.36 The three wrongs recognized in Sosa rely on
similar historical sources, but the question remains, which legal
pronouncements legitimately define the modern law of nations?
C. The Scope of Actionable ATS Claims
After Sosa, the door to actionable claims under the ATS was
kept ajar. subject to vigilant doorkeeping by the federal courts.
37
But just how far open is this door and which claims should be
permitted to enter? The answers to these questions lay at the heart
of unraveling the modern ATS puzzle. To begin, the plain
language of the ATS grants jurisdiction over violations of the law
31. Id. at 725.
32. Id. at 724 (citing 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND 68 (1769)).
33. Id. at 715.
34. Id. at 724 (stating that "we have found no basis to suspect Congress had any
examples in mind beyond those torts corresponding to Blackstone's three primary
offenses").
35. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
36. Engle, supra note 11, at 6 n.25-26 (citing Al Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134,
1148 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (for prize jurisdiction)).
37. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 729.
2009]
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
of nations.38 Therefore, one must undertake an analysis that
determines: (1) What potential- actions fall within customary
international law and (2) which of these norms are as "accepted by
the civilized world and defined with a specificity comparable" to
how safe conducts, rights of ambassadors, and piracy were in
1789.39
According to generally accepted definitions, customary
international law "results from a general and consistent practice of
states followed by them from a sense of legal obligation."' The
question then becomes, how do we determine which CIL
principles are as fully recognized as those that were actionable in
1789? " The Supreme Court alluded to this issue in United States v.
Smith.4 2 In discussing the interpretation of a statute prohibiting
piracy, the Court noted, "[o]ffences, too, against the law of
nations, cannot, with any accuracy, be said to be completely
ascertained and defined in any public code recognized by the
common consent of nations," suggesting the common law must be
relied upon to define some understood, but unenumerated,
offenses. 
4 3
The application of CIL in U.S. courts triggers a visceral
response in some. According to the "revisionists," CIL has the
status of federal common law only when there is authorization to
treat it as such under the Constitution, a statute, a treaty, or an
executive proclamation." This reasoning follows from the post-
Erie interpretation that federal common law, to the extent it still
38. 28 U.S.C. § 1350.
39. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725.
40. RESTATEMENT (THIRD).OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 102(2) (1987). See also Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1)(b),
59 Stat. 1055, 1060 (1945) (stating that international custom is a source of law that can be
applied by the international Court of Justice "as evidence of a general practice accepted as
law"). The ICJ recognizes "the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations"
as a source of law. Id. at art. 38(1)(c). It could be argued that certain general principles,
which may not have ripened into customary law, support ATS claims. That discussion,
however, is beyond the scope of this article.
41. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725, 737-38. See also Bradley et al., Customary International
Law, supra note 1, at 897 n.146 (arguing that the CIL claims available under the ATS are
much more limited than CIL in the general international law sense. ATS CIL violations
are a "subset of all CIL violations.").
42. Smith, 18 U.S. at 153.
43. Id. at 159.
44. See Weisburd, supra note 1; Trimble, supra note 1. See generally Bradley et al.,
Customary International Law, supra note 1, at 870-71.
[Vol. 31:183
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exists, must be grounded in actual federal law. 5 The Supreme
Court notes that "[like substantive federal law itself, private rights
of action to enforce federal law must be created in Congress."' In
fact, some cases suggest the Court "has also adopted a restrictive
approach in recent years to the judicial recognition of private
rights of action under federal statutes and the Constitution.""
The "modernists" take a different approach, arguing that CIL
has the status of self-executing federal common law and is to be
applied without implementing legislation. ' This argument appeals
to the universal nature of the law of nations, which many suggest
should be interpreted by States in a similar fashion, rather than
through the bifurcated process of implementing domestic
legislation. Under this paradigm, a broader interpretation of CIL is
warranted. In fact, at least one commentator argues that the
development of CIL has accelerated as a result of State
participation in multilateral intergovernmental organizations and
the proliferation of non-governmental organizations. Under this
view, rather than limit actionable ATS claims, they should be
expanded.
This interpretation, however, runs afoul of the very heart of
the Sosa decision. As stated by the Court, "We have no
congressional mandate to seek out and define new and debatable
violations of the law of nations, and modern indications of
congressional understanding of the judicial role in the field have
not affirmatively encouraged greater judicial creativity.""
Environmental torts are an example of a failed attempt to create a
45. See also Bradley et al., Customary International Law, supra note 1, at 878 (citing
Nw. Airlines, Inc. v. Transp. Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77, 95 (1981) for the proposition
that "the federal lawmaking power is vested in the legislative, not the judicial branch of
government"); Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943). See generally
Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938); Banco Nacional De Cuba, 376 U.S. 398.
46. Alexander, 532 U.S. at 286.
47. Bradley et al., Customary International Law, supra note 1, at 881. See also Corr.
Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 66-74 (2001); Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1357
n.3 (2008) (for a case limiting private rights of action under a treaty without express
language to the contrary).
48. Bradley et al., Customary International Law, supra note 1, at 870-71 (citing
Henkin, supra note 1, at 1561); Kadic, 70 F.3d at 246; In re Marcos H, 978 F.2d at 502;
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. §§ 111 cmt. d,
115 cmt. e; Brilmayer, supra note 1, at 295, 303-04, 332 n.109; Koh, supra note 1, at 1846-
47.
49. Steinhardt, supra note 1, at 2265 n.108.
50. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 728 (rejecting national constitutions and part of the Restatement
as sources of defining arbitrary detention as a CIL violation actionable under ATS).
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new violation of the law of nations in the courts. 1 The Second
Circuit denied jurisdiction over an environmental claim brought
under the ATS, noting "environmental torts are* unlikely to be
found to violate the law of nations." 2 Without congressional
action, others will continue to claim new and creative law of nation
violations under the ATS.3
The different interpretations as to the scope of CIL remain
contentious. Verifying which of these norms have been established
with the same certainty as the eighteenth century law of nations
violations is more difficult still. Nevertheless, one may certainly
use federal common law as a gap-filler, particularly when the
applicable CIL norm under an ATS claim cannot be found in a
federal statute or treaty. As the next section discusses, defining
CIL norms absent legislation becomes nearly impossible as long as
the "modernist" and "revisionist" views on applicable sources of
law remain irreconcilable."
D. Sources Providing Evidence of Customary International Law
The sources of law relied upon as evidence of CIL norms
represents a continual struggle. In determining causes of action for
violations of international law, it seems that a broad survey of
foreign and international law sources would effectively indicate
the State practice. This issue, however, remains particularly
divisive in the courts and the academy.
51. Engle, supra note 11, at 12-15.
52. Ajuindo v. Texaco, 303 F.3d 470, 476 (2d Cir. 2002). See also Bano v. Union
Carbide, 273 F.3d 120, 122 (2d Cir. 2001); Beanal, 197 F.3d at 166-67; Jota v. Texaco, 157
F.3d 153, 155-57 (2d Cir. 1998).
53. Other areas of interest which have arguably risen to the level of CIL include the
prohibition on trafficking in persons as well as standards set out in the Convention on the
Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, U.N. GAOR, 61st Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc.
A144/49 (Sept. 2, 1990), which to date has 193 State Parties, with the noticeable absence of
the United States (signed but not ratified) and Somalia. See Office of the United Nations
High Commissioner for Human Rights, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?
src=TREATY&mtdsgno=IV-11&chapter=4&lang=en.
54. International humanitarian law best highlights the conflict over defining CIL
norms with any degree of specificity. In 2005, the International Committee of the Red
Cross concluded a study aimed at enumerating CIL norms in armed conflict.. See generally
JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, INT'L COMM. FOR THE RED
CROSS, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW (2005). The U.S. response
best reflects the contentiousness of this study. See also John B. Bellinger III & William J.
Haynes II, A US Government Response to the International Committee of the Red Cross
Study Customary International Humanitarian Law, 89 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 443, 444
(2007) [hereinafter Bellinger & Haynes, US Response].
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The Filartiga Court relied on a wide range of sources to
determine the CIL claim at issue." Seeking evidence that torture
existed as a law of nations violation comparable to those
recognized in 1789, the Court utilized State pronouncements 6 , the
United Nations Charter, 7 the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights," treaties not yet ratified by the United States,5 9 and foreign
constitutions. Later, courts relied less on State pronouncements
and consensus, and gave greater weight to actual State practice.'o
Sosa suggested a more stringent test in applying CIL than the
lower courts.61 Defining accepted norms by the civilized world to
the same degree as violations of safe conduct, infringement of the
rights of ambassadors, and piracy in 1789,62 the Court refocused on
the practice of States and gave little validity to other international
sources. Specifically, the Court gave little weight to the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)63 and the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 6 which, although
ratified, never became self-executing nor enforceable in U.S.
courts. 65 The Court also rejected national constitutions (consensus
prohibiting arbitrary detention is a norm, but highly general),' an
International Court of Justice case (different international norms
and detention was more severe and longer), 7 and federal case law
55. Fildrtiga, 630 F.2d at 881-84.
56. Id. at 884.
57. Id. at 881.
58. Id. at 882.
59. Id. at 883-84.
60. Bradley et al., Customary International Law, supra note 1, at 890 (citing Flores v.
Southern Peru Copper Corp., 414 F.3d 233, 250 (2d Cir. 2003)); United States v. Yousef,
327 F.3d 56, 103 n.37 (2d Cir. 2003) (favoring "formal lawmaking and official actions of
States" over scholarly opinions as proper bases for determining states' practices). See also
J. Patrick Kelly, The Twilight of Customary International Law, 40 VA. J. INT'L. L. 449, 470
(2000).
61. See, e.g., Sosa, 542 U.S. at 724-25. See also Bradley et al., Customary International
Law, supra note 1, at 900 n.169 (citing In re Marcos 1, 25 F.3d at 795 and Presbyterian
Church of Sudan, 244 F. Supp. 2d at 305 as examples of pre-Sosa lower court decisions
mistakenly relying on the Restatement as a source of CIL violations actionable under the
ATS).
62. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 736.
63. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess.,
1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948).
64. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S.
171 [hereinafter ICCPR].
65. 138 CONG. REC. S4781-01, art. III(1); Sosa, 542 U.S. at 735.
66. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 737 n.27.
67. Id.
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(more assertive view expressed on federal judicial discretion on
CIL claims than the Supreme Court takes).' One of the more
profound statements issued by the Court referenced the ICCPR,
which the United States has ratified. The Court noted that there
existed an implication that ."the presence of a norm in the ICCPR
no longer provides significant evidence of a CIL cause of action in
ATS cases."69
The invasive nature of applying international and foreign
sources used in constitutional interpretation concerns some
scholars. But should we not, contrary to these concerns, welcome a
new era of "judicial globalization," as suggested by others? 0 The
truth lies somewhere between these opposing views.
In order to remain a leader in guiding the development of
international legal norms, the United States would benefit from an
interpretation of the law of nations that took the practice of' other
nations into account. For example, the principles enshrined in the
UDHR-a document co-authored by Eleanor Roosevelt-have
undoubtedly become part of customary international law."1 In fact,
several Supreme Court cases cite the UDHR as a measure to judge
other norms. "
Similarly, the Sosa decision short-changed the ICCPR. Not
only has the United States ratified the ICCPR, many consider it
the embodiment of several important customary international
human rights standards. Recall that providing consistent federal
remedies for law of nations violations served as the founders'
primary foreign relations concern and was the rationale behind the
ATS in 1789.' 3 Utilizing sources recognized by the global
community as reflecting customary international law norms would
follow that intent..
68. Id.
69. Bradley et al., Customary International Law, supra note 1, at 899 (citing Aldana v.
Del Monte Fresh.Produce, N.A., Inc., 416 F.3d 1242, 1247 (11th Cir. 2005) (disapproving
pre-Sosa district court decisions that had relied on the ICCPR)).
70. MARTIN S. FLAHERTY, SEPARATION OF POWERS IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT, IN
JUDGES, TRANSITION, AND HUMAN RIGHTS 12 (John Morrison et al. eds., 2007) (citing
Anne-Marie Slaughter, Judicial Globalization, 40 VA. J. INT'L L. 66 (2004)).
71. Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in
Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276, Advisory
Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. 16 (June 21). See also John Humphrey, The International Bill of
Rights: Scope and Implementation, 17 WM. & MARY. L. REV. 527, 529 (1976).
72. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 520 n.14 (1970); Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1,
15 n.13 (1965); Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 371 U.S. 554, 554, 564 n.16 (1963).
73. See supra Part II.A. and text accompanying note 10.
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The "modernists" have welcomed the Supreme Court's
reliance on international legal sources in recent years.74
Nonetheless, the "judicial globalization" honeymoon may be
short-lived in light of cases such as Medellin.75 This debate is a
direct reflection of the inability to resolve the scope of CIL norms
actionable under the ATS, and the sources of law used to prove
the viability of these norms in ATS cases.
Notwithstanding the academic discussion, the courts
experience the locus of the struggle. The resort to an ill-defined
body of law, 76 drawing from debatable sources, does not bode well
for consistent jurisprudence. Claimants deserve to know with more
certainty when they have a legitimate cause of action, and
prospective defendants need to know how to amend their behavior
in order to avoid violating the proscribed actions under the ATS.
Well-defined legislation will, in large part, preclude the above
debate as to which torts remain actionable, and which sources of
law apply. The legislation will be the courts' guidance.
Iii. CURRENT SUBJECTS OF ATS LITIGATION
The subject areas currently being litigated under the ATS fall
into four primary categories. First, there are the traditional
Filartiga-like cases in which the law of nations violator/torturer is
found within the territorial United States. Second, there are claims
against foreign governments, challenging their internal policies as
they relate to their own citizens. The third, and most active field in
ATS litigation, is the corporate aiding and abetting liability cases.
Finally, a new area of litigation that will likely grow in coming
years relates to U.S. officials being sued for actions taken in the
context of the so-called War on Terror. Each of these areas raises
74. See Steinhardt, supra note 1, at 2259; Martin S. Flaherty, The Future and Past of
U.S. Foreign Relations Law, 67 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 169, 173 (2004). See also Leila
Nadya Sadat, An American Vision for Global Justice: Taking the Rule of (International)
Law Seriously, 4 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L.R. 329, 342 (2005). See generally Harold
Hongju Koh, The Ninth Annual John W. Hager Distinguished Lecture, The 2004 Term:
The Supreme Court Meets International Law (Oct. 28, 2004), in 12 TULSA J. COMP. &
INT'L. L. 1, 12 (2004).
75. Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1357 n.3 (2008). The significance of the
Medellin decision cannot be overlooked. This Court, in particular, seems unlikely to
extend private rights of action for ill-defined CIL violations without implementing
legislation of those norms.
76. See, e.g., the debate over CIL as applied in the international humanitarian law
context in the ICRC CIL Report and the U.S. State Department Reply. See ICRC STUDY,
supra note 54; Bellinger & Haynes, US Response, supra note 54.
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considerable issues-in its own right absent guiding legislation from
Congress.
A. When Human Rights Violators Are in the United States
The Filartiga case was the first, and best, example of a foreign
official found in the United States who could be served with an
ATS claim by another foreign national." This type of claim, while
seemingly in line with U.S. human rights objectives," raises
concerns over whether the United States intended for the ATS to
be used between two foreign parties, particularly when the
conduct in question has little to no connection to the United
States.
While certain policy considerations should be taken into
account, the law clearly allows for these actions. The Court held
that Congress has the authority, under the "arising under" clause,
to confer jurisdiction on U.S. courts for claims brought by foreign
plaintiffs against foreign defendants. 79
Proponents of these actions argue that Congress .not only
recognized this form of extraterritorial extension of human rights
claims, but "approved and expanded -the court's ruling in
Filartiga.'0 Supporting this argument is the enactment of the
Torture Victims Protection Act (TVPA).8 ' To be clear, "[t]he
TVPA creates a cause of action against one who commits torture
or extrajudicial killing and was intended to codify judicial decisions
recognizing such a cause of action under the Alien Tort Claims
Act." 2 There is no doubt in the case of foreign officials who
subject an individual to torture or extrajudicial killing, 3 that the
TVPA - over the ATS - now controls the field. '
According to the legislative history, but not the language of
the TVPA, the statute also applies to "anyone with higher
77. See generally Fildrtiga, 630 F.2d. 876
78. Memorandum for the United States, Filrtiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir.
1980) (No. 79-6090), reprinted in19 I.L.M. 585,604 (1980).
79. Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480, 480-81 (1983) (cited in the
TVPA Majority Senate Report, S. REP. No. 102-249, at 5 (1991)).
80. Engle, supra note 11, at 17 (citing Kadic, 70 F.3d at 243).
81. Torture Victims Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 102-256, § 2, 106 Stat. 73 (1992)
[hereinafter TVPA].
82. Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767, 778 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing 28 U.S.C. §
1350; S. REP. No. 102-249, at 3-5 (1991)); H.R. REP. No. 102-367, at 3-4 (1991)).
83. TVPA, § 2.
84. Enahoro v. Abubakar, 408 F.3d 877,884 (7th Cir. 2005).
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authority who authorized, tolerated or knowingly ignored those
acts." 5 Subsequent cases have applied the same standard and even
extended a "command responsibility" theory of liability usually
reserved for war crimes.' In Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, the Ninth
Circuit relied on a post-WWII military tribunal case referenced in
the Senate report, ' as well as the Statute of the, International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia to develop its tort-
based command responsibility theory. Although it is well
established in the United States that civil actions for conduct
underlying criminal offenses are allowed, juxtaposing theories of
liability from the criminal side to the civil is at times problematic.
In this instance, the courts come dangerously close to confounding
the laws of war, as utilized in war crimes prosecutions, with civil
liability for acts occurring in the absence of an armed conflict.
While "the goal of international law regarding the treatment of
noncombatants in wartime... is similar to the goal of international
human rights law,"' we should not overextend the similarities
between this aspiration and the goals of the ATS. In contrast to
the codification and congressional intent behind the TVPA, the
ATS is not as well-defined and, according to Sosa, must only
permit claims as universally accepted as those existing under the
federal common law in 1789.o
The extraterritorial application of the TVPA is another area
of concern shared with ATS litigation. The Senate Majority and
Minority Reports to the TVPA sharply disagreed as to the scope
of these claims.9 The majority embraced the extraterritorial
component of the act, while the minority cautioned against such an
expansive application of U.S. federal law. 92 The Minority Report,
for example, questioned whether the Convention Against
Torture-as understood and ratified by the United States-
85. CURTIS A. BRADLEY & JACK L. GOLDSMITH, FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW CASES
AND MATERIALS 499, 552 (2006) [hereinafter BRADLEY & GOLDSMITH, FOREIGN
RELATIONS] (citing S. REP. NO. 102-249, at 9 (1991)).
86. See, e.g., Ford v. Garcia, 289 F.3d 1283, 1288-89 (11th Cir. 2002); Hilao, 103 F.3d
at 777; Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 187 (D. Mass. 1995); Paul v. Avril, 812 F.
Supp. 207, 211-12 (S.D. Fla. 1993).
87. Hilao, 103 F.3d. at 777.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732.
91. See BRADLEY & GOLDSMITH, FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 85, at 521-22;
(citing S. REP. No. 102-249 (1991)).
92. Id.
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contemplated an extraterritorial extension of civil liability for
torture claims as provided for in the TVPA.93 President George
H.W. Bush expressed similar misgivings when he signed the TVPA
into law, stating, "U.S. courts may become embroiled in difficult
and sensitive disputes in other countries, and possibly ill-founded
or politically motivated suits, which have nothing to do with the
United States and which offer little prospect of successful
recovery." 94
Rather than expand available claims, the TVPA has several
limitations in the scope of its application. The most obvious limit
under the TVPA is that it only creates a cause of action for two
specific offenses: torture and extrajudicial killing." The statute
also requires an exhaustion of local remedies prior to utilizing U.S.
courts,9 and there is a ten-year statute of limitations.' Similarly,
just as these limits relate more to the nature of the subject matter
within the TVPA, the requirement that it be by an "individual"
suggests that imputing liability requires a certain amount of State
action, although it is an open question as to how much. ' This holds
true in spite of certain protections for States under the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), as discussedbelow.
B. Suits Against Foreign Officials
The drafters of the ATS, mindful of the founders' concerns,
likely sought a unified approach to complying with international
law and avoiding conflicts with other nations. The question
remains whether contemporary use of the ATS is consistent with
that purpose.' Several issues arose, as suits against foreign officials
became a burgeoning area of litigation, including: the extent to
which U.S. municipal law was intended to govern the conduct of
93. Id.
94. See id. at 520 (citing Statement by President George Bush Upon Signing H.R.
2092, 28 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 465, March 16, 1992, reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N.
91).
95. TVPA, § 2.
96. TVPA, § 2(b).
97. TVPA, § 2(c).
98. TVPA, § 2(a). See Engle, supra note 11, at 20 (discussing when state action is
required).
99. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 750 (providing "[t]he notion that a law of nations, redefined to
mean the consensus of states on any subject, can be used by a private citizen to control a
sovereign's treatment of its own citizens within its own territory is a 20th century invention
of internationalist law professors and human-rights advocates." (Scalia, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment)).
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other States; the impact these suits have on U.S. foreign relations;
and whether this form of ATS litigation interferes with the
prerogatives of the executive branch.
Historically, the integrity of a sovereign was sacrosanct, and
courts were reluctant to become involved in how States treat their
citizens. According to a Second Circuit Court case in 1976 dealing
with reparations to a Jewish survivor of Nazi Germany whose
property was confiscated by the State, "[t]here is a general
consensus... that [international law] deals primarily with the
relationship among nations rather than among individuals." " Well
before this case, however, the individual was becoming a subject in
international law. 10' The development of international human
rights and international criminal law began in earnest after World
War II-most notably the prosecution of Nazi war criminals at the
Nuremburg military tribunal and the adoption of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights- and continues today. 1 In the early
twenty-first century, there can be no doubt that "how a state treats
individual human beings ... is a matter of international concern
and a proper subject for regulation by international law." 03
The recognition of the individual as a subject of international
law does not clarify the extent to which "our courts [should] sit in
judgment of the conduct of foreign officials in their own countries
with respect to their own citizens."'" Largely because foreign
relations fall within the purview of the political branches, there are
certain limits on filing claims against States and foreign officials in
U.S. courts.
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), 15 for
example, is the only way in the United States to gain jurisdiction
over a foreign sovereign. 106 The general rule is that the foreign
State is immune from liability for its sovereign acts unless there is
a waiver of immunity, or if the State is engaged in commercial
100. Drefus v. Von Finck, 534 F.2d 24, 30-31 (2d Cir. 1976).
101. John P. Humphrey, The International Law of Human Rights in the Middle
Twentieth Century, in RICHARD B. LILLICH & HURST HANNUM, INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS: PROBLEMS OF LAW, POLICY, AND.PRACTICE 49 (4th ed. Aspen 2006).
102. Id.
103. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. at vol.
1,144-45.
104. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 817 (1).C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J.,
concurring).
105. 28 U.S.C. §1605; Engle, supra note 11, at 41-47.
106. Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 249, 355 (1993).
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activity. 0 A waiver of immunity may be implied, but this is strictly
construed against the private plaintiff. '0' Commercial acts, referred
to as acto jure gestionis in the international context, are actionable
against the State if the act occurred, or has direct effects, in the
United States. 109
The courts must exercise caution when interpreting a claim
that pierces sovereign immunity, as the consequences could have
diplomatic significance. Judge Ginsburg, in Princz v. Fed. Republic
of Germany, wisely noted:
We think that something more nearly express [than the FSIA
implied waiver provision] is wanted before we impute to the
Congress an intention that the federal courts assume
jurisdiction over the countless human rights cases that might
well be brought by the victims of all the ruthless military juntas,
presidents-for-life, and murderous dictators of the world, from
Idi Amin to Mao Zedong. Such an expansive reading of § 1605
(a)(1) would likely place an enormous strain not only upon our
courts but, more to the immediate point, upon our country's
diplomatic relations with any number of foreign nations. In
many if not most cases the outlaw regime would no longer even
be in power and our Government could have normal relations
with the government of the day-unless disrupted by our
courts, that is. 110
If the FSIA does not stand in the way, ATS claims against foreign
sovereigns could still have damaging effects.
Not unlike the Sovereign State, foreign officials are afforded
immunity in certain circumstances. Ministers and heads of state
once enjoyed absolute immunity during their term in office. "'
Once their term is complete, State officials enjoy qualified
immunity, 2 and in some instances, no immunity at all if their
107. See generally Sampson v. Federal Republic of Germany & Claims Cong., 250 F.3d
1145 (7th Cir. 2001).
108. Id. at 1149, 1151 (where immunity was not implicitly waived, even though the acts
in question related to jus cogens norms).
109. See, e.g., Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428
(1989); Austl. Gov't Aircraft Factories v. Lynne, 743 F.2d 672 (9th Cir. 1984). See also
Engle, supra note 11, at 45.
110. Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany, 26 F.3d 1166, 1174 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
111. Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136-37 (1812).
112. Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Congo v. BeIg.), 2002 I.CJ. 121 para. 61
(Feb. 14).
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actions relate to commercial activity or takings. 113 There is no
immunity for acts committed that are illegal under the law of the
State. 114
Following the Filartiga decision, some judges were concerned
that the ATS was being interpreted to allow "our courts [to] sit in
judgment of the conduct of foreign officials in their own countries
with respect to their own citizens.." .. In Sampson v. Fed. Republic
of Germany, this notion was taken to its limit when the Seventh
Circuit reasoned that in spite of alleged violations of jus cogens
norms,11 6 there is no obligation to remedy such violations. 117
Proponents of this type of ATS action claim that precluding a
cause of action for human rights abuses goes against the doctrine
that "every right, when withheld, must have a remedy." ... As
discussed below, actions under the ATS may not be the only
remedy available to victims of human rights violations.
The State Department, often partnering with the Department
of Justice, advocates that the political solution to violating States
must take precedence over a judicial solution. 119 The former legal
advisor to the Secretary of State, John Bellinger, has expressly
raised concerns over the extraterritorial application of U.S. laws as
seen in ATS cases, and the undermining effect this has on the
executive's diplomatic policies. 12 In ATS cases, the State
Department often submits "statements of interest" to the Court
asking for dismissal based on political considerations. 12' These
113. Sugarman v. Aeromexico, 626 F.2d 270, 273-74 (3d Cir. 1980) (citing Letter of
Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Adviser, Department of State, to Acting Attorney General
Philip B. Perlman (May 19, 1932), reprinted in 26 Dep't of State Bull 984, 984-85 (1952)).
114. See generally Fildrtiga, 630 F.2d at 876.
115. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d 774 at 813 (Judge Bork, concurring).
116. Jus cogens is a special set of customary international law from which no
derogation is permissible. See Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 714 (9th Cir.
1992) (quoting the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 53, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 332, 8 I.L.M. 679); Comm. of U.S. Citizens Living in Nicar. v. Reagain, 859 F.2d
929, 940 (D.C. Cir. 1988); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
OF THE U.S. § 102 cmt. k.
117. Sampson, 250 F.3d 1145 at 1150.
118. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 147 (1803) (citing WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE 3 COMMENTARIES 109).
119. Bellinger, supra note 3.
120. Id.
121. Republic of Aus. v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677 (2004) (discussing State Department
statements of interest in the context of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976).
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statements draw sharp criticism from commentators and human
rights advocates. 122
The courts, however, do not always rely on executive branch
statements in ATS cases involving foreign sovereigns and officials.
Utilizing the immunity theories, the political question doctrine, the
act of state doctrine, and forum non conveniens, the courts have
some tools available to preclude suits that are not properly before
them. 123 While some argue that these tools of abstention or judicial
deference allow for "vigilant doorkeeping," many frivolous claims
are permitted to slip through, particularly in the corporate
litigation context.
C. Corporate Cases
There is no better microcosm in which to view the relentless
debate surrounding the application of the ATS than in cases
involving corporate liability. 124 It has been noted that "[b]oth the
scholarship provided by those in the field of human rights gazing at
[multi-national enterprises] and the scholarship offered by those
gazing back the other way from [corporations] to human rights is
startling in its positivistic approach." 125
The most controversial theory of liability for corporations
under the ATS is seen in the aiding and abetting cases. 126 Even
though there is no indication in the language of the ATS itself of
122. Derek Baxter, Protecting the Power of the Judiciary: Why the Use of State
Department "Statements of Interest" in Alien Tort Statute Litigation Runs Afoul of
Separation of Powers Concerns, 37 RUTGERS L.J. 807 (2006); Sarah H. Cleveland, The
Alien Tort Statute, Civil Society, and Corporate Responsibility, 56 RUTGERS L. REV. 971
(2004); Stephens, supra note 1.
123. See, e.g., Steinhardt, supra note 1, at n.153 (citing Ahmed v. Hoque, No. 01 Civ.
7224(DLC), 2002 WL 1964806 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2002); Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC, 221 F.
Supp. 2d 1116, 1185-86 (C.D. Cal. 2002); United States v. Noriega, 746 F. Supp. 1506, 1539-
40 (S.D. Fla. 1990); Hwang Geum Joo v. Japan, 172 F. Supp. 2d 52, 64-67 (D.D.C. 2001).
But see Hwang Geum Joo v. Japan 332 F.3d 679, 687 (D.C. Cir. 2003), dismissal
reaffirmed, 413 F.3d 45 (2005), on remand, 542 U.S. 901 (2004), and Al Odah v. United
States, 321 F.3d 1134, 1147 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
124. In re Nazi Era Cases Against German Defendants Litig., 129 F. Supp. 2d (D.N.J.
2001); Presbyterian Church of Sudan, 244 F. Supp. 2d at 289; Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., No.
01 Civ. 8118, 2002 WL 31082956 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 2002); Bodner v. Banque Paribas, 114
F. Supp. 2d 117 (E.D.N.Y. 2000); Doe v. Unocal Corp., (Unocal 1), 963 F. Supp. 880 (C.D.
Cal. 1997); Doe v. Unocal Corp., (Unocal I1), 110 F. Supp. 2d 1294 (C.D. Cal. 2000).
125. Sally Wheeler, Corporations, Human Rights, and Social Inequality, in JUDGES,
TRANSITION, AND HUMAN RIGHTS 426 (John Morison et al. eds., Oxford Univ. Press
2007).
126. See e.g., Doe I v. Unocal Corp., (Unocal Appeal), 395 F.3d 932, 947 (9th Cir.
2002).
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third party liability for violations of the law of nations, many argue
that multi-national corporations must be held accountable for their
alleged complicity in cases of human rights abuse. 127 To allow such
claims, however, would greatly expand the "modest number" of
claims under ATS suggested by Sosa. '" Moreover, innovative
interpretations of ATS claims should be left to Congress. Under
the ATS and the standards articulated in Sosa, aiding and abetting
liability for corporations does not meet the "definite content and
acceptance among civilized nations."' 29 In Sosa the court focused
on the ATS standard-whether international law norms were
universal enough to allow suits against different parties to include
corporations. 1'
Not only is it doubtful that the ATS extends to aiding and
abetting liability, the sources evidencing such liability are
problematic. For example, in the Apartheid Litigation case, the
Court found the international sources to be inadequate for ATS
purposes. 3' Furthermore, relying on non-binding decisions of
international criminal tribunals as evidence of aiding and abetting
liability in CIL is erroneous. The international criminal tribunals
do not create binding sources of law and are concerned with
criminal, rather than civil matters. "2 The gap between what Sosa
declined to consider enforceable ATS claims for arbitrary arrest
and detention applies doubly to aiding and abetting liability-
there are far fewer sources to confirm the status of aiding and
abetting as a CIL claim.
If this theory of liability holds, then a significant number of
defendants in the United States will be subject to ATS jurisdictio n,
in part, because corporations have more assets and are better
targets of litigation. Far from being a noble tool combating human
127. See, e.g., David Weissbrodt & Muria Kruger, Norms on the Responsiblities of
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights,
97 AM. J. INT'L L. 901 (2003) [hereinafter Weissbrodt & Kruger].
128. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 724.
129. Id. at 732.
130. Id. at 724-28.
131. Lucien J. Dhooge, A Modest Proposal to Amend the Alien Tort Statute to Provide
Guidance to Transnational Corporations, 13 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 119, at 138,
n.112 (2007).
132. Id. at 138 (citing In re S. African Apartheid Litig., 346 F. Supp. 2d 538 (S.D.N.Y.
2004), rev'd sub nor Khulumani v. Barclay Nat'l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, (2d Cir. 2007)).
In contrast, see Steinhardt, supra note 1, at 2286 n.204 (citing international criminal
tribunals as evidence that corporations may be held liable under an aiding and abetting
theory).
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rights abuse, ATS litigation in this context is likely based more on
politics and greed. "' Furthermore, it has been U.S. policy to object
to the use of aiding and abetting liability to combat transnational
crime.
Similar to political branch pronouncements, the Supreme
Court declined to imply aiding and abetting liability in civil cases
under the securities fraud statute, arguing this expanded litigation
would imply policy trade-offs best resolved by Congress. 135 When
Congress acted, it did not allow private causes of action for aiding
and abetting in this field. 136
In the context of ATS litigation, the lower courts are in
conflict over whether aiding and abetting liability for human rights
abuses is a common law claim consistent with Sosa. Some courts
held that when Congress has not explicitly provided for aiding and
abetting liability for private actors, it should not be implied. "' In
other cases, the courts relied on the fact that significant human
rights violations were at stake, and based their decisions, in part,
on international common law. 38 Ultimately, the uncertainty in the
ATS aiding and abetting jurisprudence must -be clarified by
Congress. As one commentator notes, "Whether corporations
should be liable for aiding and abetting violations of customary
international law is an issue that will need to be addressed in the
first instance by the political branches." 139
133. Bellinger, supra note 3, at 14-15.
134. See, e.g., UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION AGAINST TRANSNATIONAL
ORGANIZED CRIME: DECLARATIONS & RESERVATIONS, at 7, available at
http://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/mtdsg/volume ii/chapter xviii/xviii-12.en.pdf.
135. See, e.g., Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164,
181-82, 189-90 (1994) (concluding that civil liability for aiding and abetting was
uncertain-requiring explicit application by Congress in a statute).
136. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761, 769 (2008)
("The § 10(b) implied private right of action [under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
15 U.S.C.S. § 78j(b)] does not extend to aiders and abettors. The conduct of a secondary
actor must satisfy each of the elements or preconditions for liability; and we consider
whether the allegations here are sufficient to do so.").
137. Ruiz v. Martinez, EP-07-CV-078-PRM, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49101 (W.D. Tex.
May 17, 2007); Corrie v. Caterpillar, Inc. (Corrie 1), 403 F. Supp. 2d 1019 (W.D. Wash.
2005), affd, 503 F.3d 974, (9th Cir. 2007); Mujica v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 381 F.
Supp 2d 1164 (C.D. Cal. 2005); Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 393 F. Supp. 2d 20 (D.D.C.
2005); In re S. African Apartheid Litig., 346 F. Supp. 2d 538 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
138. See Almog v. Arab Bank, PLC, 471 F. Supp. 2d 257 (E.D.N.Y. 2007); Bowoto v.
Chevron Corp., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63209; Presbyterian Church of Sudan, 374 F. Supp.
2d at 337-38 (allowing aiding and abetting liability); In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig.,
373 F. Supp. 2d 7, 53 (E.D.N.Y 2005).
139. Bradley et al., Customary International Law, supra note 1, at 929.
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Others do not see a need to reform the ATS, as it is
considered a useful tool in combating gross international human
rights violations. Corporations, they argue, must share liability
with the violating States from which they derive significant
monetary gain. "4 There should be little doubt that "certain forms
of conduct violate the law of nations whether undertaken by those
acting under the auspices of a state or only as private
individuals."1 '1 It follows that "corporations may. be liable for
violations of international law." 142 Even conceding this point, it is
one thing to hold corporations liable for offenses they actually
commit and still another to hold them liable as a third party,
removed from the law of nations violation itself.
Proponents of this view argue that courts must have flexibility
in evidentiary tests and may find a nexus between corporate and
state conduct under a "color of law" theory. "' Under this theory,
"[a] private individual acts under color of law within the meaning
of [42 U.S.C. § 1983] when he acts together with state officials or
with significant aid." 14 But the jurisprudence underpinning this
theory of third party liability is plagued with inconsistencies. 141
Courts have held that private parties may be found liable for State
conduct when the act "in law [is] deemed to be that of the
State," 46 when there is significant aid from the State, "47 or when
there is a "substantial degree of cooperative action" between the
State and private actor. 141 Other cases have held that sharing a
"common unconstitutional goal," 149 or merely a close financial
140. See, e.g., Weissbrodt & Kruger, supra note 127; Beth Stephens, The Amorality of
Profit: Transnational Corporations and Human Rights, 20 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 45 (2002);
Steven R. Ratner, Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal Responsibility, 111
YALE L.J. 443 (2001).
141. Kadic, 70 F.3d at 239. See also In re Marcos II, 978 F.2d at 499; Carmichael v.
United Techs. Corp., 835 F.2d 109, 113-14 (5th Cir. 1988).
142. Presbyterian Church of Sudan, 374 F. Supp 2d at 308. See generally Steinhardt,
supra note 1, at 2286 n.204.
143. Smith, 18 U.S. at 159. See generally Steinhardt, supra note 1, at 2289-90.
144. Kadic, 70 F.3d at 245.
145. George v. Pacific-CSC Work Furlough, 91 F.3d 1227, 1230 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing
Leebron v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374 (1995)).
146. Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982).
147. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715,725 (1961).
148. Gallagher v. Neil Young Freedom Concert, 49 F.3d 1442, 1453 (10th Cir. 1995).
149. Cunninham v. Southlake Ctr. For Mental Health, Inc., 924 F.2d 106, 107 (9th Cir.
1991).
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relationship, is enough to inripute liability. 150 Given the incongruent
results in the "color of law" cases, there seems to be little chance
that they are as sufficiently well-defined as the causes of action
under the laws of nations in 1789.
Ultimately, aiding and abetting liability fails the test set out in
Sosa. Not only is this theory of liability not as well recognized as
the eighteenth century paradigm, but these cases run a serious risk
of interfering with U.S. foreign policy similar to the cases against
foreign officials. As mentioned by John Bellinger, former Legal
Advisor to the Department of State, several States-many of
which are leaders in international human rights-have objected to
ATS claims filed against their corporations. 151
D. Suits Against U.S. Officials Post-9/11
Yet another area of litigation under the ATS is emerging. The
most recent cases concern U.S. government actions during the
"war on terror." Here, cases include challenges to the legality of
military commissions to try detainees held at Guantanamo Bay,
Cuba and others involving allegations of torture, arbitrary.
detention, and unlawful rendition. 152 Under the Alien Tort Statute,
only the claimant need be an alien, not the defendant. 153 Also, the
Federal Tort Claims Act partially waives sovereign immunity, but
leaves an exception for claims "arising in a foreign country." 154
Therefore, U.S. government officials, and former officials, are
potentially open to liability.
Nonetheless, it remains unlikely that these cases will be
successful under the ATS after Sosa. At present, it is uncertain
which of these claims, if any, were as specifically defined as those
in 1789. Furthermore, the practical consequences of any of these
150. Jatoi v. Hurst-Euless-Bedford Hosp. Auth., 807 F.2d 1214, 1221-22 (5th Cir. 1987),
modified on denial of reh'g, 819 F.2d 545 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1010 (1988).
151. Bellinger, supra note 3, at 17 (referencing objections made by Canada, Australia,
and the United Kingdom against claims filed against their corporations under the ATS).
152. See, e.g., Rasul v. Myers (Rasul I1), 512 F.3d 644 (D.C. Cir. 2008); In re
Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443 (D.D.C. 2005); Khalid v. Bush, 355 F.
Supp. 2d 311 (D.D.C. 2005); Rasul v. Rumsfeld (Rasul I), 414 F. Supp. 2d 26 (D.D.C.
2006); E1-Masri v. Tenet, 437 F. Supp. 2d 530 (E.D. Va. May 12, 2006); Omar v. Harvey,
416 F. Supp. 2d 19 (D.D.C. 2006) (petition for writ of habeas corpus).
153. 28 U.S.C. § 1350.
154. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (2000); 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (2000); 28 U.S.C. § 2671-2680
(2000).
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actions could have a severe impact on the political branches'
ability to undertake a robust foreign policy.
While the applicability of CIL in the U.S. constitutional
context raises many questions, it should not be necessary for the
executive to engage in a guessing game when tackling significant
foreign policy issues. "' In the many potential claims arising under
the ATS it is unclear whether the president may disregard CIL
when there is no statute or treaty behind the CIL norm. The
Supreme Court expressly provided that CIL should be applied
"where there is no treaty, and no controlling executive or
legislative act or judicial decision." 16 On the other hand, some
argue that "[i]f CIL is not automatically domestic federal law, then
it is hard to see how it is binding on the President as part of the
'Laws' that he must faithfully execute under Article II." 157
Domestic court application of CIL is rooted in
congressional/executive authorization. For example, in Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld, the Court reasoned that even though Common Article
Three to the Geneva Conventions could not be invoked as a
source of law, it was part of the international law of war, which
Congress recognized in the Uniform Code of Military Justice. 158
Therefore, even though Common Article Three is considered a
part of CIL, it was applicable in U.S. courts through a federal
statute.
The lack of congressional authorization for suits against U.S.
officials, past and present, is at least one indication that ATS suits
in this area will ultimately fail. Successful reform to the ATS must
allow for political considerations -specifically, for the executive to
weigh in on certain issues. Conducting foreign policy is the most
obvious and important issue on which the executive will need to be
heard in future litigation.
155. For cases where CIL could not override controlling executive acts, see Barrera-
Echavarria v. Rison, 44 F.3d 1441, 1451 (9th Cir. 1995); Gisbert v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 988
F.2d 1437 (5th Cir. 1993); Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446 (11th Cir. 1986)' For a case
where CIL binds the president at least absent official presidential act, see In re Agent
Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 373 F. Supp. 2d 7, 109-10 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).
156. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677,700 (1900).
157. Bradley et al., Customary International Law, supra note 1, at 931.
158. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 561-632 (2006).
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IV. Is THERE A NEED FOR REFORM? JUDICIAL DEFERENCE AND
PRACTICAL CONSEQUENCES: THE DOOR RESTS WIDE OPEN
While the need for amending the ATS seems self-evident to
some, to others the judiciary has established ample safeguards to
prevent overly broad and political interpretations of the law of
nations. Theories of judicial deference to the political branches are
already subject to certain limits. These include the political
question doctrine and the restrictions established by the Sosa
decision with regard to political consequences of ATS litigation.159
A. Judicial Deference
The political question doctrine sets some limits on the types
of cases that the judiciary will hear. 160 Thus, nearly every case
brought under the ATS will be challenged on the grounds of a
non-justiciable political question. In a recent case, Sarei v. Rio
Tinto, the Ninth Circuit rejected the defendant's claims that the
case involved a non-justiciable political question. 161 In a two-to-one
decision, the court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss based
on the political question doctrine established in Baker v. Carr. 162
The Court did not consider the executive's statement of interest
which stated that "continued adjudication of the claims ... would
risk a potentially serious adverse impact on the peace process [in
Papua New Guinea], and hence on the conduct of our foreign
relations." 163
In Matar v. Dichter, the Court dismissed a claim against a
former Israeli official, who allegedly committed war crimes and
crimes against humanity by carrying out Israeli policy in Gaza. 164
The Court based its dismissal on the grounds that the Israeli
official was acting in his official capacity at all times in question,
159. Sosa, 542 U.S. 692.
160. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
161. Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 487 F.3d 1193 (9th Cir. 2007), reh'g granted, 499 F.3d 923
(9th Cir. 2007).
162. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (establishing the six factors for non-justiciable
political questions and holding that the political question doctrine should apply when
there are no judicially manageable standards for the court to apply).
163. Sarei, 487 F.3d at 1205-06. See also Sarei v. Rio.Tinto, PLC, 550 F.3d 922 (9th Cir.
2008) (remanding to the District Court for the limited purpose of determining whether
there is a requirement for plaintiffs to exhaust local remedies).
164. Matar v. Dichter, 500 F. Supp. 284 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
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and the acts were clearly political in nature and non-justiciable
under the political question doctrine. 165
In spite of the judiciary's own policies of deference, it is
uncertain that judge-made policies alone will be sufficient to filter
out frivolous ATS claims. Unfortunately, there is no bright line
distinction between non-justiciable political questions and
otherwise actionable claims. As stated in the Achille Lauro case,
the political question doctrine concerns political questions, not
political cases.166
Similarly, the act of state doctrine was meant to keep the
courts out of foreign affairs controversies. The doctrine arises
where the relief sought or the defense asserted requires a court in
the United States to declare invalid the official acts of a foreign
sovereign performed in its own territory. 167 In determining the
applicability of the doctrine, courts have considered whether the
foreign sovereign acted in the public interest. 168
The Restatement makes it clear that U.S. courts will not
review the official acts of foreign governments taken within their
own territory so long as any injury arose from a law or official
policy. 169 This doctrine is of particular relevance here when one of
the primary applications of ATS cases concern foreign
governments. 170 As common sense dictates, however, violating
regimes will not designate their acts of human rights abuses as
official State policy. Therefore, the act of state doctrine does filter
certain ATS cases, but in a limited capacity.
Forum non conveniens is another method of keeping ATS
cases with few connections to the United States out of the federal
courts. 171 Yet for the defendant in ATS human rights cases, it can
be extremely difficult to prove that an adequate alternative forum
exists. "2 This and other discretionary doctrines like it are
insufficient to add clarity-both to plaintiffs and defendants
alike -to actionable ATS claims.
In spite of the doctrines of judicial deference already in
place-perhaps also as a result of them-the Sosa Court was wary
165. Id.
166. Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro, 937 F.2d 44, 49 (2d Cir. 1991).
167. Banco Nacional De Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 416 (1964).
168. Doe v. Unocal Corp. (Unocal I), 963 F. Supp. 880, 893 (C.D. Cal. 1997).
169. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. § 443.
170. See, e.g., Kadic, 70 F.3d at 232; Unocal Appeal, 395 F.3d at 932.
171. See, e.g., Ajuindo v. Texaco, 303 F.3d 470 (2d Cir. 2002).
172. See Steinhardt, supra note 1, at 2278.
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of an adventurous judiciary carving out new causes of action under
the ATS where none previously existed. 173 It is clear that the
Supreme Court in the majority of cases favors the creation of
private rights of action by the legislature, not the courts. 174 Even
now, the courts appear to have no congressional mandate to define
new, debatable violations of the law of nations.
B. Practical Consequences
Paramount among the concerns in ATS cases are the
potential implications for U.S. foreign relations. In fact, the Sosa
Court reiterates the authority of the executive and legislature to
manage foreign affairs. 175 As stated in Sosa, "[T]he determination
whether a norm is sufficiently definite to support a cause of action
should (and, indeed, inevitably must) involve an element of
judgment about the practical consequences of making that cause
available to litigants in the federal courts." 176
The courts look to the political branches in most cases dealing
with foreign affairs. For example, in head of state immunity cases,
some courts go by the congressional authority under FSIA, while
others ask for executive branch authorization. 177 In all cases, courts
look, at least to some degree, for political branch authorization. 78
The lack of congressional guidance in ATS cases demands an even
greater deference to executive branch interests.
173. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 731-32.
174. Id. at 726-27 (citing Correctional Services Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 68
(2001); Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275,286-87 (2001)).
175. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 726.
176. Id. at 732-33. See also Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 456 F. Supp. 2d 457, 462
n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (suggesting that Sosa "may have intended to convey that in addition to
considering whether a norm has sufficient definiteness and acceptance, a court should
consider practical consequences of allowing it to be the subject of suit in federal court")
(emphasis in original).
177. Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Pinochet and International Human Rights
Litigation, 97 MICH, L. REV. 2129, 2166 (1999).
178. Bradley et al., Customary International Law, supra note 1, at 924 (citing the
following cases for the proposition that most courts look to executive branch authorization
to apply head of state immunity, Ye v. Zemin, 383 F.3d 620, 624-25 (7th Cir. 2004); United
States v. Noriega, 117 F.3d 1206, 1212 (11th Cir. 1997); Doe v. Roman Catholic Diocese,
408 F. Supp. 2d 272, 277-78 (S.D. Tex. 2005); Lafontant v. Aristide, 844 F. Supp. 128, 137
(E.D.N.Y. 1994)). Bradley cites other cases where courts only recognize head-of-state
immunity when there is explicit executive branch suggestion of immunity, including,
Jungquist v. Nahyan, 940 F. Supp. 312, 321 (D.D.C. 1996), rev'd on other grounds, 115 F.3d
1020 (D.C. Cir. 1997). Others rely on lack of executive branch communication in weighing
against immunity. See, e.g., First Am. Corp. v. AI-Nahyan, 948 F. Supp. 1107, 1120-21
(D.D.C. 1996).
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Those arguing against limits on the application of the ATS
readily push for an expansive reading of CIL. 179 Is CIL not our law
which the executive must enforce? In support of this proposition,
many cite the Paquete Habana case out of context. ,8 While it is
true that international law is our law, the Court goes on to explain
that international law is U.S. law absent a controlling executive or
legislative act. 181 Similarly, under the Charming Betsy canon of
statutory interpretation, many argue that the ATS should be read
not to conflict with international law principles. 18 Again, the
correct application is to read ambiguous statutes in a light that
does not contradict international law to the extent possible. 183
Congress needs to enact an unambiguous ATS amendment in
order to remove any doubt as to the scope of actionable claims.
Similar to these historic cases, the Sosa court stated that "[f]or
two centuries we have affirmed that the domestic law of the
United States recognizes the law of nations." "M Based on the Sosa
opinion, U.S. courts can recognize CIL, but that does not
incorporate CIL into domestic law, let alone make it federal law.
This simply means that U.S. law "can take account of CIL"
independent of the modern position. 185
At least one commentator, however, argues that even prior to
the Paquete Habana, the Court foreclosed the notion that
''customary international law depended for its domestic
enforceability on statutory authorization." " It is further argued
that CIL is self-executing, and no affirmative legislation is needed
to apply it in U.S. courts. '
8
179. See Steinhardt, supra note 1, at 2259, n.76 (stating that "customary international
law remains an area in which no affirmative legislative act is required to 'authorize' its
application in U.S. courts").
180. Id.
181. See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 700.
182. Steinhardt, supra note 1, at n.181.
183. See generally Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy (Charming Betsy), 6 U.S. (2
Cranch) 64 (1804).
184. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 729. See also William S. Dodge, Bridging Erie: Customary
International Law in the U.S. Legal System After Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 12 TULSA J.
COMP. & INT'L L. 87, 95-96 (2004); Gerald L. Neuman, The Abiding Significance of Law in
Foreign Relations, 2004 SuP. CT. REV. 111, 129-30 (2004); Steinhardt, supra note 1, at
2252.
185. Bradley et al., Customary International Law, supra note 1, at 907.
186. Steinhardt, supra note 1, at 2259 (citing Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 209 (1796); De
Longchamps, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 111 (1784)).
187. Henkin, supra note 1, at 1561.
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Putting this view in perspective, to date Congress has
incorporated limited CIL provisions. Moreover, political branches
have placed strict limits on international human rights norms and
their ratification -arguing that they do not want these norms to be
the basis of private litigation.
Citing Sabbatino, the Sosa Court recognized the institutional
limits on the "competence to make judicial rules of decision of
particular importance to foreign relations, such as the act of state
doctrine." " The Court explained that even in the foreign relations
context, "the general practice has been to look for legislative
guidance before exercising innovative authority over substantive -
law."' 89 In spite of this clear pronouncement, many still maintain
that CIL is ripe for federal common law making by the courts. "
While customary international law is one area that arguably
remains within the federal common law, 191 the Sosa Court was
right to warn of-if not ask for relief from-judicial rules made
without legislative guidance.
For example, the Sosa Court, in discussing the Apartheid
Litigation cases, warned that "[i]n such cases, there is a strong
argument that federal courts should give serious weight to the
executive branch's view of the case's impact on foreign policy." 92
In cases that involve U.S. treaty obligations or treaties between
two foreign sovereigns, the courts have historically deferred to the
executive.
John Bellinger agrees. He states that "the ATS has given rise
to friction, sometimes considerable, in our relations with foreign
governments, who understandably object to their officials, or their
domestic corporations, being subjected to U.S. jurisdiction for
activities taking place in foreign countries and having nothing to
do with the United States." 9' He explains that the Sosa Court
recognized the potential harm in. impinging on the "discretion of
188. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 726.
189. Id. See Bradley et al., Customary International Law, supra note 1, at 902.
190. See generally Steinhardt, supra note 1, at 2251, n.35-38.
191. See, e.g., Banco Nacional De Cuba, 376 U.S. at 424-26; Tex. Indus. Inc. v.
Radcliffe Materials Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 641 (1981). See generally Steinhardt, supra note 1, at
2251.
192. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 734 n.21.
193. See generally Flatow v. Islamic Rep. of Iran, 305 F.3d 1249 (D.C. Cir. 2002); Sea
Hunt, Inc., v. Unidentified Shipwrecked Vessel or Vessels, 221 F.3d 634, 642-43 (4th Cir.
2000); Joo v. Japan, 413 F.3d 45, 49 (2005).
194. Bellinger, supra note 3, at 2-3.
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the legislative and executive branches in managing foreign
affairs." 195
C. The Time Is Right For Reform
The executive branch is vocal in ATS cases. As mentioned
above, the U.S. Department of State, frequently in conjunction
with the U.S. Department of Justice, files letters, briefs and
statements of interest in ATS cases that might impact U.S. foreign
relations. '9 In contrast, Congress has remained silent for nearly
220 years. 19 The time is right to provide legislative guidance to the
courts who serve as the "vigilant doorkeepers" to human rights
claims under the ATS.
The Supreme Court in Sosa stated, "[W]e would welcome any
congressional guidance in exercising jurisdiction with such obvious
potential to affect foreign relations. ,, 98 Following Sosa, some
lower courts still craved guidance. As noted in the Apartheid
Litigation case,
While it would have been unquestionably preferable for the
lower federal courts if [Sosa] had created a bright-line rule that
limited the ATCA to those violations of international law
clearly recognized at the time of its enactment, the Supreme
Court left the door at least slightly ajar for the federal courts to
apply that statute to a narrow and limited class of international
law violations beyond those well-recognized at that time. 199
195. Id. at 8. As one example, Mr. Bellinger cites a series of ATS suits filed by Chinese
Falun Gong members against Chinese officials who were traveling through the United
States on official business. "The diplomatic friction caused by these cases runs directly
contrary to one of the reasons for enacting the ATS-to prevent harassment of foreign
officials in the United States and prevent international incidents." Id. at 18-19.
196. Many commentators criticize this practice. See, e.g., Baxter, supra note 122, at 808.
See also Stephens, supra note 1, at 169-70 (arguing that executive opposition to ATS
claims is not entitled to judicial deference).
197. Bellinger, supra note 1, at 3. An attempt to reform the ATS was made in 2005 by
Senator Diane Feinstein. See S. 1874, 109th Cong. (2005); 151 CONG. REC. S11,433-36
(2005). The Bill was quickly stalled, however, largely due to an outcry from the human
rights community. See, e.g., Eliza Strickland, Was DiFi Batting for Big Oil?, EAST BAY
EXPRESS, Nov. 9, 2005, available at http://www.eastbayexpress.com/news/
was difi batting-for-big-oil_/Content?oid=290129. For further discussion see Aron
Ketchel, Note, Deriving Lessons for the Alien Tort Claims Act from the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act, 32 YALE J. INT'L L. 191, 217-18 (2007).
198. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 731.
199. In re S. African Apartheid Litig., 346 F. Supp. 2d at 547 (citing Sosa, 542 U.S. at
723-25, 728-30).
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The Courts are reaching out for guidance, in part, because
they are ill equipped to deal with the subject matter of foreign
relations, which is typically reserved for the political branches. In
spite of warnings in Sosa, the lower courts continue to allow
inconsistent results and adventurous causes of action to slip
through the door. "
In this regard, the extraterritorial application of U.S. law in
ATS cases remains troubling for both the executive and foreign
governments. 201 On one hand, the executive is put in a difficult spot
by pressure from foreign governments to act on their behalf in
these cases. Silence from the executive could be interpreted by the
Court to mean there are no foreign policy concerns. Conversely,
foreign States could.interpret this to mean that the United States
cares less about their relations. Moreover, statements of interest
could be read as political support for the activities of States over
the legitimate interests of plaintiff victims. " There should be a
provision in an updated ATS providing for deference to the
political branches in certain cases. This is consistent with recent
foreign relations cases.
Another reason to reform the ATS is to clarify the scope of
actionable claims. Clarity in the form of federal legislation will
remove the need to define CIL in each ATS case. Rather CIL
would serve as a gap-filler for causes of action not explicitly
provided for in the statute. The practical reasons for guidance are
clear.
The executive, for one, should not be put in the unenviable
position of possibly violating CIL. Currently, the courts are split
on whether the executive is bound by CIL as controlling federal
law." The plaintiff must establish the norm at issue as defined
200. See generally Bellinger, supra note 3, at 10-12.
201. Id. (mentioning that, in spite of the Sosa Court.singling this case out by name, the
Second Circuit reversed the District Court dismissal of lsuzu Motors v. Ntsebeza, also
known as the Apartheid Litigation. The Supreme Court denied certiorari. 128 S. Ct. 2424
(2008) (mem.)).
202. Bellinger, supra note 3, at 23.
203. See, e.g., Republic of Aus. v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677 (2004); American Ins. Ass'n
v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 426-28 (2003).
204. BRADLEY & GOLDSMITH, FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 85, at 499 (citing the
following cases for the proposition that the executive may violate CIL, Barrera-Echavarria
v. Rison, 44 F.3d 1441, 1451 (9th Cir. 1995); Gisbert v. United States Attorney General,
988 F.2d 1437, 1448 (5th Cir. 1993); Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446, 1454-55 (11th Cir.
1986) (relying heavily on Paquete Habana that CIL is to be used in U.S. courts "only
'where there is no treaty and no controlling executive or legislative act or judicial
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with the specificity of Sosa's eighteenth century paradigms. Even
human rights proponents agree that such standard of proof is
vague and ill-supported by case law. 205 In light of the reluctance to
create new theories of liability without political branch
interpretation, 21 legislative guidance, informed by the executive,
would take the guess-work of ATS cases out of the hands of
litigants and the judiciary.
Finally, by passing legislation there would no longer be the
debate about applicable CIL norms and the proper sources to use
as evidence of these norms. As previously mentioned, Congress
has the constitutional authority to define and punish offenses
against the law of nations. 208 By revising the ATS for the purposes
of clarification, there will be no need to denigrate valued
international law sources such as the UDHR or the ICCPR, or
engage in philosophical arguments about the meaning of Paquete
Habana. An updated ATS will be the controlling legislation which,
rather than supplant CIL norms, will compliment internationally
recognized human rights standards. This will "ensure the ATS
does not complicate international efforts by the political branches
to promote human rights abroad, a cause to which the United
States is deeply committed." "
The proponents of ATS actions see no reason to amend the
statute because there is ample precedence of judicial deference
and jurisdictional safeguards, discussed in detail above.21"
Specifically, the political question doctrine, the act of state
doctrine, and the theories of immunity all set limits on ATS
actions. 21"' The courts are also adept at filtering out creative causes
of action not anticipated by the drafters. 21 Evidence of judicial
restraint is seen in the growing number of ATS actions dismissed
decision ....' (quoting Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900))). Contra Fernandez v.
Wilkinson, 505 F. Supp. 787, 195, 198 (D. Kan. 1980) (standing for the proposition that
CIL overrides the executive).
205. Steinhardt, supra note 1, at 2261.
206. See In re South Africa Apart. Litig., 346 F. Supp. 2d at 550; Central Bank of
Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver 511 U.S. 164, 176-77, 180-81, 189-90 (1994).
207. See generally Bellinger, supra note 3, at 27.
208. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10 ("The Congress shall have Power... To define and
punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offences against the Law of
Nations.").
209. Bellinger, supra note 3, at 3.
210. See supra, Part IV.A.
211. Id.
212. Id.
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when the CIL norm at issue could not be proven with the requisite
specificity. 213
Furthermore, it is argued, the ATS is an effective tool for
combating human rights violations. "' These suits advance the
cause in several ways, to include: (1) promoting accountability and
providing a voice to victims of abuse (particularly when there is no
other forum), (2) raising public awareness of human rights abuse,
which could potentially encourage political and preventative
measures, and (3) advancing U.S. development of CIL norms. 215
In spite of the best intentions of ATS advocates, many of
these arguments are policy driven, and based less in the law.
Moreover, not every suit filed under the ATS is motivated by
justice, but by money and politics. 26 No matter how capable the
federal courts are, the fact remains that they are calling out for
congressional guidance in these cases.217
As stated above, Congress has not spoken on the issue and
has set no limitation on the type of suits permissible under the
ATS. Moreover, there is currently no formal role for the executive
in ATS litigation. 218 This. is in sharp contrast to the role of the
executive in terrorism cases, as they fall under the FSIA. Under
the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (amending
the FSIA),219 States designated as sponsors of terrorism by the
executive may be sued. This is an exception to the FSIA, which
213. See, e.g., Flores v. Southern Peru Copper Corp., 343 F.3d 140, 172 (2d Cir. 2003)
(environmental torts not CIL violations); Hamid v. Price Waterhouse, 51 F.3d 1411, 1418
(9th Cir. 1995) (regular fraud not violation of law of nations); Maugein v. Newmont
Mining Corp., 298 F. Supp. 2d 1124, 1130 (D. Colo. 2004) (transnational defamation not
CIL violation); Guinto v. Marcos, 654 F. Supp. 276, 281 (S.D. Cal. 1986) (full First
Amendment freedoms not CIL norm); Zapata v. Quinn, 707 F.2d 691, 692 (2d Cir. 1983)
(fairness of state lottery distribution systems no CIL violation).
214. See, e.g., Steinhardt, supra note 1, at 2247.
215. Bellinger, supra note 3, at 14.
216. See Steinhardt, supra note 1, at 2278 ("The balance of public and private factors is
similarly left to the sound discretion of the court and determined ad hoc.") (emphasis
added).
217. See, e.g., Guinto, 654 F. Supp. at 281 ("...we are constrained to a large extent by
the customs and usages of international law"). See also Sosa, 542 U.S. at 744-46 (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (explaining that the Court cannot create new federal common law causes of
action); Bellinger, supra note 3, at 7 ("That task would necessarily fall to the Congress.").
218. See Bellinger, supra note 3, at 24 ("Without a formal role in the statute, the
Executive's participation through statements of interest and amicus briefs is one of the few
pratical ways that the United States can seek to confine the scope of the ATS .... ").
219. 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (2006) (amended on Jan. 28, 2008 to remove that portion of the
statute).
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generally bars suits against foreign States. 20 The key here is
participation in foreign affairs issues by both branches. Congress
established the parameters of the cause of action, and took into
account the concerns of the executive, by allowing it to designate
certain States as sponsors of terror, thereby stripping them of
FSIA immunity. 
221
In contrast, under the ATS there has only been judicial
decision making, which has been referred to as a "democratic
cost."' Unlike statutory or treaty law, ATS law is now largely
judicially based. "f The time for legislative clarity is now.
V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REFORM
Amending the ATS "could serve the interests of both
plaintiffs and defendants, as well as the judiciary."" Striking the
proper balance is crucial. Maintaining the integrity of the ATS as a
useful mechanism to combat violations against the law of nations
without compromising U.S. foreign policy objectives is no small
task. Ultimately, there must be a statute of limitations, an
exhaustion of remedies requirement, and clearly defined causes of
action.
The first step in drafting the reform statue is to set procedural
limits. Following the model of the TVPA, the revised ATS should
include a ten-year statute of limitations. The Ninth Circuit has
already imputed the TVPA's statute of limitations onto ATS
actions. 2' Also following the lead of the TVPA, an exhaustion of
local remedies will be required prior to bringing suit in U.S. district
courts. 26 This will prevent forum shopping, but will not be
insurmountable. Plaintiffs must simply overcome a rebuttable
presumption that, for actions occurring outside of the United
States, the foreign jurisdiction is better suited to handle the claim.
If, however, the plaintiff can make a reasonable proffer that the
alternative forum is not able to provide a fair trial, or there is no
220. 28. U.S.C. § 1604 (2006).
221. Bellinger, supra note 3, at 21 (discussing the 1996 exception to FSIA). But see
Ketchel, supra note 197, at 214-15 (comparing the invocation of the political question
doctrine in FSIA cases v. ATS cases, arguing for a legislative solution to prevent executive
"abuse" of the political question doctrine).
222. Bellinger, supra note 3, at 16, 19.
223. Ketchel, supra note 197, at 214.
224. Steinhardt, supra note 1, at 2290.
225. Papa v. United States, 281 F.3d 1004, 1012-13 (9th Cir. 2002).
226. Pub. L. No. 102-256, Sect. 2(b), 106 Stat. 73 (Mar. 12, 1992).
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similar cause of action under the foreign State's laws, then the
district courts may exercise jurisdiction. 227
Second, and perhaps most importantly, the violations must be
clearly defined. Embracing the human rights potential of a
reformed ATS-tentatively titled the Alien Tort Prevention Act
(ATPA) -an international perspective must be utilized in drafting
the new statute.
The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law provides
that "[a] state has jurisdiction to define and prescribe punishment
for certain offenses recognized by the community of nations as of
universal concern."" In drafting the revised statute, it would be
wise to stay true to the customary international law norms
specified in the Restatement itself. This is not only an indication of
issues of universal concern, but is also well regarded in the
domestic and international legal academy.
The Restatement lists the following violations of the law of
nations: genocide, slavery or slave trade, murder or causing the
disappearance of individuals, torture or other cruel, inhumane, or
degrading treatment or punishment, prolonged, arbitrary
detention, systematic racial discrimination or a consistent pattern
of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights. 229
While not all of the violations listed above are as well defined
as others," it is within the authority of Congress to define the law
of nations violations that are enforceable through a private right of
action. "' There is a colorable argument to be made, however, that
each of these violations falls within CIL. The norms may not be as
well defined as safe passages, ambassadorial protections, and
piracy, but they need not be. A significant aspect behind the
amended statute is to do away with the eighteenth century
paradigm puzzle. With a law on the books, the debate over scope
and sources will end.
227. Id.
228. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. § 404.
229. Id. at § 702.
230. See generally Dhooge, supra note 131, at 141 (arguing that only torture,
extrajudicial killing, genocide, slavery and slave trading are sufficiently well defined to
satisfy the standards of the ATS). To maintain clarity in the proposed amended statute, it
might be helpful to omit the language "consistent pattern of gross violations of
internationally recognized human rights." On the other hand, it could be argued that this
phrase serves as a catch-all for future human rights violations that develop into customary
international law norms.
231. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10 ("The Congress shall have power... To define...
Offences against the Law of Nations.").
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Finally, by adding a simple provision to the statute allowing
for case by case deference to the executive when cognizable
foreign policy interests are at stake, the judiciary will be able to
determine just how much weight to give statements of interest.
This is consistent with cases such as Altmann, Garamendi, and, of
course, Sosa.
Embracing an amended ATS can serve the conciliatory
function of combating human rights violations while respecting the
priorities of the political branches in foreign affairs. Allowing
plaintiffs to file claims with more confidence and encouraging
potential defendants to modify their behavior, the revised ATS
will clear away a great deal of uncertainty experienced in the
courts today. 'In this sense, the political branches will put their
weight behind the judicial watchmen as they guard the door.
232. For a discussion of deference to the executive in ATS cases based on specific and
foreseeable harm to U.S. foreign policy interests, see Clarens, supra note 6.
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